Combinatorial scoring auctions by Müller, R.J. et al.
  
 
Combinatorial scoring auctions
Citation for published version (APA):
Müller, R. J., Perea ý Monsuwé, A., & Wolf, S. (2007). Combinatorial scoring auctions. (METEOR
Research Memorandum; No. 020). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and
Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2007
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf 
 
Combinatorial Scoring Auctions 
 
RM/07/020 
 
 
JEL code: C72, D44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht research school of Economics 
of TEchnology and ORganizations 
 
Universiteit Maastricht 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
P.O. Box 616 
NL - 6200 MD Maastricht 
 
phone : ++31 43 388 3830 
fax : ++31 43 388 4873 
 
 
 
 
 
Combinatorial Scoring Auctions
Rudolf Mu¨ller ∗ Andre´s Perea † Sascha Wolf ‡
June 11, 2007
Abstract
This paper is concerned with a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement mechanism
called combinatorial scoring auction. In the setting that we analyze, private information
of the suppliers is multi-dimensional. The buyer wants to procure several items at once.
Subsets of these items are characterized by a price as well as by a number of non-monetary
attributes called quality (e.g. completion time). The suppliers submit offers specifying
prices and quality levels for these subsets. These offers are evaluated according to a quasi-
linear scoring rule. Based on the resulting scores suppliers win contracts for the delivery
of certain items. Such a contract only specifies the set of items a supplier has to deliver
and a score that he has to meet. The decision about the specific price-quality combination
yielding this contracted score is at the discretion of the supplier who aims at optimizing
his own profit.
We analyze the equilibria in such auctions and show the link between combinatorial
scoring auctions and combinatorial price-only auctions. We demonstrate how this link
can be used to employ preexisting knowledge about the equilibrium behavior in regular
price-only auctions in the strategic analysis of combinatorial scoring auctions. Our results
are the multi-item extension to the results of Asker and Cantillon (2007).
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1 Introduction
The design and analysis of combinatorial auctions is a flourishing field in auction theory
drawing the interest of researchers from the area of game theory as well as from the area of
computer science. (Or as Roger B. Myerson puts it on the back cover of Cramton, Shoham
and Steinberg (2006): “Combinatorial auctions are the great frontier of auction theory today,
. . . ”.) While single item auctions only allocate one item at a time, combinatorial auctions are
used to allocate multiple items all at once. By doing this, complementary or substitutable
preferences of the bidders for different item sets can be taken into account. The majority of
research conducted on combinatorial auctions (but this also holds for single item auctions)
considers the price as the unique strategic dimension for bidders. That is, bidders offer prices
for different sets of items based on which the items are allocated.
However, there are situations in which auction participants are not only concerned with
the price of items but also with other non-monetary attributes of the items (called quality).
Take for example the construction of a building. The construction process can be subdivided
into several tasks on which contractors can bid. The building owner does not only care about
the prices at which these tasks are executed by the contractors but also about non-monetary
attributes of these tasks, like the completion time, the quality of the used materials, the
construction quality or the probability that the contractor goes bankrupt during the job
and leaves the task unfinished. On the other side, due to different levels of specialization,
contractors might be able to take over several tasks or only some special tasks. Also, the
contractor having the lowest cost for a specific task might differ depending on the quality
level. That is, the low cost contractor for a task at a low quality level might not be the
same as the low cost contractor for the same task at a higher quality level. Thus, it can be
important to consider other strategic dimensions than just price.
One way to deal with combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement problems, like the one
described above, is using combinatorial scoring auctions. In our paper we analyze the equi-
libria in such combinatorial scoring auctions. Specifically, we aim at extending the results
of Asker and Cantillon (2007) who consider a setting for single item scoring auctions where
item quality and bidders’ types are multi-dimensional. For each bidder they construct a
one-dimensional pseudo-type which is the maximum level of apparent social surplus that this
bidder can generate (“apparent” because for its construction the scoring rule is used, which
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can differ from the buyer’s true valuation function). Asker and Cantillon (2007) show that
knowledge of bidders’ pseudo-type distributions is sufficient for describing equilibrium out-
comes and the buyer’s expected equilibrium utility. This finding allows them to establish a
link between single item scoring auctions and standard single item independent private value
(IPV) price-only auctions. Specifically, for each single item scoring auction in their setting
they identify a corresponding single item IPV price-only auction in which a bidder’s type is
his pseudo-type. They then show that the strategic analysis of a scoring auction reduces to
the strategic analysis of the corresponding price-only auction. We establish the multi-item
extension of this result. That is, we also construct pseudo-types, now consisting of the maxi-
mum levels of apparent social surplus that a bidder can generate for the different item sets,
and we show a link between combinatorial scoring auctions and combinatorial price-only auc-
tions. This link is again established by identifying for each combinatorial scoring auction a
corresponding price-only auction.
1.1 Related Work
Che (1993) analyzes single item scoring auctions where the supplier bidding the highest score
is contracted the delivery of the item. He considers a setting where the item quality is one-
dimensional, suppliers’ private information is also one-dimensional and suppliers’ production
costs depend on the quality level as well as on their own private information. Furthermore,
he considers scoring rules that are linear in price. In order to construct equilibria in these
auctions he makes use of the maximum level of social welfare that a supplier can produce
(which is well defined once the scoring rule is given), also called a supplier’s pseudo-type.
By employing a relatively simple change in variables, he is able to transform the problem of
finding equilibria in the scoring auctions into the problem of finding equilibria in standard
single item IPV price-only auctions, which are well-studied. He also designs an optimal scoring
rule, maximizing the buyer’s utility.
Branco (1997) extends Che’s (1993) analysis of the independent cost setting to the case
where suppliers’ production costs are correlated. He characterizes an optimal direct revelation
mechanism, the implementation of which requires a two-stage auction. David, Azoulay-
Schwartz and Kraus (2002a), (2002b), (2003) and (2006) propose and analyze simultaneous
and sequential (with and without deadline) English auctions on suppliers’ scores. Their
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settings allow for two-dimensional quality and two-dimensional private information, or general
multi-dimensional quality and one-dimensional private information, respectively. However, in
the settings that they consider the functional form of the suppliers’ utility functions and the
scoring rules are more restrictive than in the foregoing papers. They also identify optimal
scoring rules for the considered settings.
Asker and Cantillon (2006), (2007) extend Che’s (1993) analysis to a single item scoring
auction setting that allows for multi-dimensional quality as well as multi-dimensional private
information for the suppliers. Asker and Cantillon (2006) show that, unlike in Che’s (1993)
one-dimensional setting, the optimal buying mechanism cannot be implemented by a scoring
auction with a scoring rule which is linear in price if suppliers information is multi-dimensional.
Furthermore, they analyze the performance of scoring auctions in comparison to the optimal
mechanism. Asker and Cantillon (2007) prove that in order to describe equilibrium outcomes
in single item scoring auctions it is sufficient to make use of suppliers’ one-dimensional pseudo-
types. However, if suppliers’ original private information is multi-dimensional, this proof is
more involved than using the simple variable transformation employed by Che (1993). As
Che (1993), Asker and Cantillon (2007) show that the problem of finding equilibria in single
item scoring auctions can be transformed into the problem of finding equilibria in standard
single item IPV price-only auctions. In this paper we deliver the multi-item extension of
this result. Furthermore, Asker and Cantillon (2007) find that scoring auctions dominate
other procedures for buying differentiated objects, like menu auctions, beauty contests and
price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.
Milgrom (2000) shows that an item can be efficiently allocated by a scoring auction which
employs the buyer’s valuation function as the scoring rule and runs a Vickrey auction on
suppliers’ submitted scores. Suyama and Yokoo (2005) investigate a combinatorial multi-
attribute procurement auction setting that allows for multi-dimensional quality as well as for
multi-dimensional private information of the suppliers. Their setting is a bit more restrictive
than the one considered in this paper as the vector of quality levels for an item set is composed
of the quality vectors of the individual items in the set. They propose a direct revelation
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)) that
determines the social surplus maximizing allocation of items and quality levels for the items.
In this mechanism it is a dominant strategy for a supplier to report his private information
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truthfully. The combinatorial VCG scoring auction presented in Section 4.1 is quite similar in
that it is essentially a direct revelation VCG mechanism based on suppliers’ pseudo-types. In
our auction the welfare maximizing allocation is determined by the auction mechanism while
the optimal quality levels are determined by the suppliers themselves. This combinatorial
VCG scoring auction is the multi-item extension of Milgrom’s (2000) scoring auction.
In addition to the theoretical work presented above, also some experimental work on single
item multi-attribute auctions has been done: Bichler (2000), Chen-Ritzo, Harrison, Kwasnica
and Thomas (2005), Strecker and Seifert (2004), Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005). In these
papers theoretical equilibrium predictions are verified and different scoring auction formats
are compared. A finding of these experiments is that multi-attribute auction mechanisms
dominate price-only auction mechanisms in terms of the buyer’s and suppliers’ utilities.
1.2 Paper Outline
In Section 2 we state some basic assumptions and definitions and describe our combinato-
rial scoring auction model which is an extension of the single item scoring auction models
considered by Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2007).
Contrary to the commonly analyzed single item scoring auctions, a buyer wants to procure
several items at once in our setting. Item sets are characterized by a price as well as by a
number of non-monetary attributes. A supplier’s production costs for the different item sets
are influenced by the chosen quality level and his type which is private information. We
allow for multi-dimensional, independently distributed private information for the suppliers
and multi-dimensional non-monetary attributes for the sets of items. The suppliers submit
offers on the different item sets specifying prices as well as quality levels for the non-monetary
attributes. Each offer is evaluated according to a scoring rule which assigns to each price-
quality offer for an item set a one-dimensional score.1 We only consider scoring rules that are
linear in price.
Based on the resulting scores an allocation rule determines which suppliers are contracted
to deliver certain sets of items. This yields for each supplier an allocation vector which has an
element for each item set (including the empty one) specifying the supplier’s probability to win
1For an introduction to scoring rules and multi-attribute decision making in general see Yoon and Hwang
(1995).
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the corresponding item set. (For example, in the case that the allocation rule is deterministic,
one element of a suppliers allocation vector is equal to one, whereas the remaining elements
are equal to zero.) The delivery contract for an item set specifies only a score that the winning
supplier has to meet. The final decision about the specific price-quality combination for the
delivered item set yielding this contracted score is at the discretion of the winning supplier.
We find that winning suppliers choose the delivered quality level independent of the score
that they contractually have to meet. That is, the contracted score effectively determines
the price a winning supplier is charging the buyer for his item set. This finding is analogous
to findings in single item scoring auction settings, see for example Che (1993) or Asker and
Cantillon (2007).
In Section 2.2 we observe that, given the scoring rule, the maximum level of apparent social
surplus that a supplier with a certain type can generate by producing and subsequently selling
a set if items is well defined. We use this finding to construct for each supplier a pseudo-type
which has an element for each set of items. Each of these elements is defined as the maximum
level of apparent social surplus that the supplier can create for the corresponding item set.
This definition of pseudo-types is analogous to the definition of one-dimensional pseudo-types
in single item scoring auction settings (see Asker and Cantillon (2007)).
Based on the possible pseudo-types, we can partition a supplier’s type space into equiv-
alence classes of types yielding the same pseudo-type. A supplier’s bidding function assigns
a bid to each of his possible types. On a particular equivalence class, a supplier’s bidding
function is doing one of the following two things. Either the bidding function assigns the same
bid to all types, in which case we say that it is not mixing on this equivalence class, or the
bidding function assigns differing bids to the types, in which case we say that it is mixing on
this equivalence class. This mixing can happen in two ways. If, given the bidding strategies of
the others, differing bids yield also differing expected allocation vectors for the supplier then
we speak of allocation mixing. However, if differing bids yield the same expected allocation
vector then we speak of allocation equivalent mixing. Note that the bidding function can do
both types of mixing on the same equivalence class.
In Section 3 we assume that in equilibrium suppliers’ bidding functions employ allocation
equivalent mixing only for a zero measure of types. Under this assumption we show (Theorem
1) that for the equilibrium analysis of a scoring auction it is sufficient to concentrate on bidding
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functions which are constant on equivalence classes of types, that is, they assign the same
bid to all types yielding the same pseudo-type. Specifically, we show that for any equilibrium
in a scoring auction we can construct a new equilibrium with bidding strategies that are
constant on equivalence classes of types. A supplier’s new bidding strategy is constructed by
picking a representative type from each equivalence class in his type space and assigning the
old equilibrium bids for these representative types also to all other types in their respective
equivalence classes. In order to ensure that the new bidding strategies indeed constitute an
equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that they differ from the suppliers’ original equilibrium
bidding strategies only on a set of types with zero measure (see proof of Theorem 1).
Unproblematic in this respect are the equivalence classes of types on which a supplier’s
original equilibrium bidding function is not mixing, since for these types his new bidding
function is identical to his original one. Potentially troublesome are the equivalence classes
on which the original bidding function is mixing, since for those types the new bidding strategy
is differing from the original one. However, by assumption we have that the set of types for
which the original bidding function employs allocation equivalent mixing has measure zero.
In addition we prove (Lemma 4) that the set of types for which the original bidding function
employs allocation mixing has also measure zero.2 This implies that the set of types for which
the original bidding function employs mixing (that is, the union of the two aforementioned
sets) has measure zero and hence, the new bidding strategy is almost everywhere the same as
the original one.
Similar to Asker and Cantillon (2007) we use two main steps in order to establish Lemma
4 (stating that the set of types for which suppliers’ equilibrium strategies employ allocation
mixing has zero measure). First, we construct for every equilibrium in the scoring auction
an auxiliary equilibrium (Lemma 2) in which suppliers’ bidding strategies are based on their
pseudo-types. This auxiliary equilibrium is constructed in such a way that a supplier’s aux-
iliary equilibrium bidding strategy specifies a mixed bid for each of his pseudo-types. The
support of such a mixed bid for a certain pseudo-type consists of all the pure bids that the
original equilibrium bidding function specifies for types in the corresponding equivalence class.
2We have to exclude allocation equivalent mixing for a non-zero measure of types by assumption because
we cannot exclude it analytically like in the case of allocation mixing. Asker and Cantillon (2007) consider
only allocation mixing. Although they do not mention it explicitly, in order to derive their results, they also
implicitly assume that in equilibrium allocation equivalent mixing is essentially excluded.
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In a second step we proof that for almost all pseudo-types this support does not contain pure
bids that yield different expected allocations for the supplier (Lemma 3).
In Section 4 we show how the existing literature on combinatorial IPV price-only auctions
can be used for the strategic analysis of scoring auctions, for example to establish equilibrium
existence, revenue equivalence and so on. Specifically, for each scoring auction we identify a
corresponding combinatorial price-only auction in which a bidder’s type, on which he bases
his bidding strategy, is his pseudo-type. By making use of the main result of the foregoing
section (Theorem 1) we establish that every equilibrium in a scoring auction corresponds to
an equilibrium in the related price-only auction which differs only on a zero measure of types,
and vice versa, every equilibrium in the price-only auction is also an equilibrium in the related
scoring auction (Corollary 1). This result is the multi-item analogue to Asker and Cantillon’s
(2007) finding that the equilibrium analysis of single item scoring auctions can be done by
analyzing corresponding single item price-only auctions instead. With Corollary 2 we also
extend Asker and Cantillon’s (2007) “Expected Utility Equivalence”-Theorem for the buyer
from single item to combinatorial scoring auctions.
In Section 4.1 we describe a combinatorial scoring auction that allocates items efficiently.
As mentioned earlier in this section, this auction relates to the direct revelation VCG mech-
anism described by Suyama and Yokoo (2005) and is the multi-item extension of a single
item scoring auction analyzed by Milgrom (2000). The above mentioned link to price-only
auctions is used to establish an equilibrium in this auction.
2 The Model
A buyer wants to procure a set of distinct items A = {1, . . . , a}. There is a set of potential
suppliers N = {1, . . . , n}. Each supplier is able to produce every item.3 The buyer does not
need to purchase from only one supplier. He can buy different subsets of items from different
suppliers. There are 2a possible subsets of items, including the empty set which we associate
with index 0. Each non-empty subset of items j, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2a − 1}, is characterized by a
sales price pj ∈ R+ and a quality level qj ∈ Rmj+ for its mj ≥ 1 non-monetary attributes. In
3In case a supplier is not able to produce certain items, this can be modeled by letting him bid infinitely
high prices for the item sets that he is unable to produce. That way he is not chosen as the supplier for item
sets that he cannot deliver.
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order to ease notation later on let us define d = 2a − 1 and m =∑dj=1mj .
The buyer’s valuation for the purchase of item set j with quality level qj at price pj is
vj (qj)− pj . Each supplier i has a type θi ∈ Θ with Θ ⊂ Rk. Θ−i denotes the set of all type
profiles θ−i =
(
θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn
)
. Supplier i’s type influences his production cost.
The cost he incurs for producing the set of items j with quality qj is denoted by cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
.
Note that all suppliers have the same cost function for item set j.4 We assume that cj is
twice continuously differentiable as well as strictly increasing in both quality and his type.
Supplier i’s profit piij from producing the set of items j with quality qj and selling it at price
pj is
piij
(
pj , qj , θ
i
)
= pj − cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
. (1)
We assume that suppliers’ type spaces are convex and compact. Types are privately observed
and independently distributed. The probability densities are common knowledge. Let γi
denote supplier i’s density on Θ. The joint density γ−i on Θ−i is then given by
γ−i
(
θ−i
)
=
∏
h 6=i
γh
(
θh
)
.
2.1 The Scoring Auction
The scoring auction works as follows. Based on his type each supplier i makes a price-quality
bid
(
pi, qi
) ∈ Rd+m+ consisting of a price-quality offer for each of the possible non-empty item
sets, that is
(
pi, qi
)
=
((
pi1, q
i
1
)
, . . . ,
(
pid, q
i
d
))
with
(
pij , q
i
j
)
∈ R1+mj+ .5 There is a scoring rule
Sj : R
1+mj
+ 7→ R,
for every possible set of items j. Using this scoring rule, each price-quality offer (pj , qj) for
the item set j is associated with a one-dimensional score Sj (pj , qj). The scoring rules for all
item sets are fixed before the bidding starts and known to every supplier. We assume that
4The assumption of suppliers having the same type spaces and the same cost functions is made for notational
convenience and can easily be relaxed.
5We are aware of the potential complexity of suppliers’ bids. Specifying a price-quality offer for each of the
2a − 1 non-empty subsets of items is highly impractical for larger sets of items. Bid complexity and represen-
tation are generally an issue in combinatorial auctions. However, concerns about the representation of bids
and bidding languages go beyond the scope of this paper and are not addressed henceforth. A comprehensive
introduction to bidding languages for combinatorial auctions is given by Nisan (2006).
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the scoring rules are quasi-linear, that is
Sj (pj , qj) = φj (qj)− pj . (2)
In addition it is assumed that φj is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing
in qj . Furthermore, we assume that for φj (qj) − cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
the matrix comprised of the
second-order partial derivatives w.r.t. qj is negative definite. More specifically, for g
(
qj , θ
i
)
=
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
we assume that the matrix
H
(
qj , θ
i
)
=

∂2g
∂qj,1qj,1
(
qj , θ
i
)
. . . ∂
2g
∂qj,1qj,mj
(
qj , θ
i
)
...
. . .
...
∂2g
∂qj,mj qj,1
(
qj , θ
i
)
. . . ∂
2g
∂qj,mj qj,mj
(
qj , θ
i
)
 ,
where qj,h denotes the hth element of qj , is negative definite for all qj and θi. Thus, g is
strictly concave in qj for all θi.
By applying the scoring rules each supplier’s original price-quality bid
(
pi, qi
) ∈ Rd+m+ is
transformed into a vector of scores si ∈ Rd consisting of a score sij ∈ R for every set of items
j. An allocation rule maps each profile of scores s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
into an allocation of items to
suppliers (or a distribution over such allocations in case the allocation rule is probabilistic),
that is it determines which supplier is allowed to provide which items to the buyer. Every
item is provided by at most one supplier which allows for the case that some items are not
procured at all. The allocation rule implies for each supplier i and each profile of scores s
an allocation vector xi(s) =
(
xi0(s), x
i
1(s) . . . , x
i
d(s)
)
where xi0(s) denotes the probability that
i is awarded the empty set, that is he does not sell any items to the buyer. Similarly, for
j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, xij(s) denotes supplier i’s probability for winning the contract giving him the
right to provide the buyer with the set of items j. In order to simplify notation we define the
allocation rule
x : Rnd 7→ [0, 1]n2a
directly as a mapping that maps each profile of scores s ∈ Rnd into an allocation vector
xi(s) ∈ [0, 1]2a for every supplier i.
Based on a profile of scores s, the winning score rule
w : Rnd 7→ Rn2a
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assigns each supplier i with a vector of winning scores wi(s) =
(
wi0(s), w
i
1(s), . . . , w
i
d(s)
)
where
wi0(s) is the payment that i has to make in case he is awarded the empty set. Thus, we allow
for the case that a supplier has to make a payment to the buyer if he did not win any delivery
contract. For j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, wij(s) is the score that supplier i has to meet in case he wins the
contract to provide the buyer with item set j. That is, he has to provide the set of items with
a quality level qj at a price pj such that Sj (pj , qj) = wij(s). This means that the buyer and
the supplier only contract a score for the item set. The actual sales price and the delivered
quality is chosen by the supplier in such a way that the contracted score is met.
2.2 Pseudo-types
Suppose that supplier i of type θi has won the contract to provide the set of items j to the
buyer and has to meet a score ω. He will choose a price-quality pair (pj , qj) that maximizes
his profit piij
(
pj , qj , θ
i
)
while meeting the score, that is Sj (pj , qj) = ω. Using (1) and (2), his
optimization problem becomes
max
(pj ,qj)
(
pj − cj
(
qj , θ
i
))
(3)
s.t. φj (qj)− pj = ω.
Substituting for pj in the objective function yields
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
))− ω. (4)
As can be seen in (4), the supplier chooses the optimal quality level independent of the
winning score that he has to meet. We assume that for every θi ∈ Θ there exits a q∗j > 0 that
maximizes φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
. Together with the strict concavity of φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
in qj
for all θi (see assumptions made earlier) this implies that q∗j is the only maximum and hence
argmaxqj
(
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
))
is well defined. Furthermore, we find the following:
Lemma 1 The set
{
maxqj
(
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
)) |θi ∈ Θ} is a closed interval in R.
Proof
Define g
(
qj , θ
i
)
= φj (qj) − cj
(
qj , θ
i
)
. Given the assumptions about g
(
qj , θ
i
)
made earlier,
we have that for each θi there exists a unique quality level q∗j that maximizes g
(
qj , θ
i
)
.
Furthermore, we have that the first-order partial derivatives of g w.r.t. qj are equal to zero
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at q∗j . That is,
∂g
∂qj,1
(
q∗j , θ
i
)
= . . . =
∂g
∂qj,mj
(
q∗j , θ
i
)
= 0,
where qj,h denotes the hth element of qj . From this and the assumptions about the second-
order partial derivatives of g made earlier it follows by the Implicit Function Theorem6 that
q∗j is a continuous function of θ
i. Thus,
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
))
= φj
(
q∗j
(
θi
))− cj (q∗j (θi) , θi)
is a continuous mapping from Θ to R. Since Θ is compact and connected also its image under
this mapping is compact and connected. This implies that the image is a closed interval in
R.
2
Based on the above we define for every θi in supplier i’s type space
t
(
θi
)
=
(
max
q1
(
φ1 (q1)− c1
(
q1, θ
i
))
, . . . ,max
qd
(
φd (qd)− cd
(
qd, θ
i
)))
. (5)
We call t
(
θi
)
the supplier’s pseudo-type. Note that suppliers’ pseudo-types are dependent
on their types as well as on the chosen scoring rules and the production cost functions.
Supplier i’s pseudo-type is monotonically decreasing in his type: Take θˆi, θi ∈ Θ such that θˆi
is componentwise smaller than θi and let q∗ij (.) denote the optimal quality level that supplier
i picks for item set j in (4) based on his type. Then, for each element j of his pseudo-type,
tj
(
θi
)
= φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))− cj (q∗ij (θi) , θi)
< φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))− cj (q∗ij (θi) , θˆi)
≤ φj
(
q∗ij
(
θˆi
))
− cj
(
q∗ij
(
θˆi
)
, θˆi
)
= tj
(
θˆi
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that costs are increasing in the type, and the
second inequality follows from the optimality of q∗ij (.).
Θt denotes the set of all types θi ∈ Θ yielding the same t as pseudo-type, that is
Θt =
{
θi ∈ Θ | t (θi) = t}. A supplier’s pseudo-type space is denoted T with T ⊂ Rd. It
is convex and compact. Pseudo-types are privately observed and independently distributed.
The distributions are common knowledge (since the scoring rules, the production cost func-
tions and suppliers’ type distributions are common knowledge). For technical reasons we
6The Implicit Function Theorem can be found in a variety of books on advanced calculus, for example
Adams (2003), p.769.
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make the additional assumption that the pseudo-type mapping has the following property: If
a set of pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero then also the set of types yielding this set
of pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero.7
Suppose that suppliers have types θ =
(
θ1, . . . , θn
)
and make reports
(
p1, q1
)
, . . . , (pn, qn)
implying the profile of scores s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
. The utility that supplier i derives from the
resulting outcome (x(s), w(s)) is
ui
(
s | θi) = d∑
j=1
xij(s)
(
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− cj
(
qj , θ
i
))− wij(s))− xi0(s)wi0(s).
Defining x˜i(s) =
(
xi1(s), . . . , x
i
d(s)
)
(that is, x˜i(s) is the allocation vector xi(s) without the
winning probability for the empty set xi0(s)) and using (5) this can be written as
ui
(
s | θi) = x˜i(s)t (θi)− xi(s)wi(s).8 (6)
Notice that supplier i’s pseudo-type captures his preference over outcomes (x(.), w(.)). (As
shown by Asker and Cantillon (2007) only quasi-linear scoring rules exhibit this property if
suppliers’ types are multi-dimensional.) By defining
yi(s) = xi(s)wi(s) (7)
we can simplify (6) to
ui
(
s | θi) = x˜i(s)t (θi)− yi(s). (8)
7We believe that this assumption is rather innocuous given that a supplier’s pseudo-type is monotonically
decreasing in his type. It may well be that it follows from the other properties, but this question is still open.
This property of the pseudo-type mapping is also needed in order to derive the results in Asker and Cantillon
(2007). However, they do not make it an explicit assumption and also do not show, how it may follow from
other properties. We consider this question also in their setting as still open.
8Note that x˜i(s)t
(
θi
)
and xi(s)wi(s) are dot products. Other instances of dot products in the remainder
of the paper are not especially pointed out.
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The corresponding buyer utility for the outcome (x(s), w(s)) if suppliers have the type
profile θ is
u0 (s | θ) =
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xij(s)
(
vj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))− pij (s, qi∗j (θi)))+ n∑
i=1
xi0(s)w
i
0(s)
=
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xij(s)
(
vj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))− φj (q∗ij (θi))+ wij(s))+ n∑
i=1
xi0(s)w
i
0(s)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i(s)
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ xi(s)wi(s)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i(s)
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ yi(s). (9)
The second equality follows from the fact that the price supplier i is asking for item set j
is determined by his optimal quality level and the winning score that he has to satisfy (see
also (3)). Specifically, pij
(
s, q∗ij
(
θi
))
= φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))−wij(s). The third equality follows from
defining v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
=
(
v1
(
q∗i1
(
θi
))
, . . . , vd
(
q∗id
(
θi
)))
and a similar definition for φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
.
The last equality follows from (7).
Supplier i’s bidding strategy βi maps each of his possible types θi ∈ Θ into a price-quality
bid
(
pi, qi
) ∈ Rd+m+ . Together with the scoring rule, βi implies a scored bidding strategy bi
mapping each of i’s types into a vector of scores si ∈ Rd. Note that for the determination
of outcomes (allocation vectors and winning scores), and hence the determination of the
buyer’s and suppliers’ utilities, only the reported scores are of importance and not the price-
quality bids that generated them. Therefore we concentrate in the following on scored bidding
strategies.9
If supplier i of type θi believes that all other suppliers bid according to the profile of scored
bidding strategies b−i =
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
, his expected utility if making a scored bid
si is
U i
(
si | θi) = ∫
Θ−i
(
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
t
(
θi
)− yi (si, b−i (θ−i))) γ−i (θ−i) dθ−i
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
t
(
θi
)− yi (si, b−i (θ−i))] . (10)
9The analysis done in the following section goes also through (in slightly adapted form) if one allows for
mixed strategies, that is, bi maps each of supplier i’s types into a distribution over finitely many score vectors.
To simplify matters we stick to pure strategies.
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The expected utility of the buyer if suppliers bid according to the profile of scored bidding
strategies b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
is
U0(b) =
∫
θ∈Θn
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ yi(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ. (11)
The profile of scored bidding strategies b constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every
supplier i and all types θi ∈ Θ
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))
t
(
θi
)− yi (bi (θi) , b−i (θ−i))]
≥ E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
t
(
θi
)− yi (si, b−i (θ−i))] ∀si. (12)
Supplier i’s scored bidding strategy might assign different bids to types yielding the same
pseudo-type. Given a profile of scored bidding strategies of the other suppliers, those bids
either induce the same expected allocation vector for i or differing expected allocation vectors.
We conclude this section by formalizing this observation and introduce the following properties
for suppliers’ scored bidding strategies:
Definition 1 (Allocation Mixing) Consider the profile of scored bidding strategies b. Sup-
plier i’s strategy bi employs allocation mixing if there exist types θi, θˆi ∈ Θ with t(θi) = t(θˆi)
for which bi
(
θi
) 6= bi(θˆi) and
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))] 6= E−i[x˜i(bi(θˆi), b−i(θ−i))].
This property deals with the expected allocation vectors induced by bids from types yielding
the same pseudo-type. Suppose that there are some types yielding the same pseudo-type for
which supplier i makes different scored bids. Allocation mixing means that, given a strategy
profile b−i of the others, the expected allocation vectors for i induced by those bids are not
the same. Furthermore, we define
Definition 2 (Allocation Equivalent Mixing) Consider the profile of scored bidding strate-
gies b. Supplier i’s strategy bi employs allocation equivalent mixing if there exist types θi, θˆi ∈
Θ with t
(
θi
)
= t
(
θˆi
)
for which bi
(
θi
) 6= bi(θˆi) but
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θˆi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
15
Similar to the first property this one also deals with the expected allocation vectors induced
by bids from types yielding the same pseudo-type. Suppose that there are some types yielding
the same pseudo-type for which supplier i makes different scored bids. Allocation equivalent
mixing means that, given a strategy profile b−i of the others, the expected allocation vectors
for i induced by those bids are the same.
In the next section we are going establish a link between equilibria in the scoring auction
which are based on types (that is, suppliers’ bidding strategies can specify different bids for
different types) and the ones which are based on pseudo-types (that is, suppliers’ bidding
strategies specify the same bid for all types yielding the same pseudo-type). For this we
finally define
Definition 3 (Almost Everywhere (A.E.) Coinciding Strategies) We say that the pro-
file of scored bidding strategies b based on types coincides with the strategy profile bˆ based on
pseudo-types a.e. if b and bˆ differ only on a set of types with Lebesque measure zero.
3 Pseudo-types are Sufficient Statistics
In this section we show that if every supplier’s bidding strategy employs allocation equivalent
mixing (see Definition 2) only for a set of types with Lebesgue measure zero, then in order
to analyse the set of possible equilibria in a scoring auction and the corresponding expected
utilities of the buyer it is sufficient to consider a restricted setting where suppliers bid based
on their pseudo-types. That is, suppliers make the same scored bid for all types yielding
the same pseudo-type. Thus, we show that pseudo-types are sufficient statistics, rendering
suppliers original types redundant for the analysis of the scoring auction equilibria.
In a first step we show that every equilibrium in the scoring auction is outcome equivalent
to a mixed strategy equilibrium where each supplier i associates all types yielding the same
pseudo-type with the same mixed bid. Two equilibria are outcome equivalent if they both
induce the same distribution over outcomes (that is allocation vectors and winning scores).
Lemma 2 For every equilibrium b in the scoring auction there exists an outcome equivalent
mixed strategy equilibrium b˜ such that b˜i
(
θi
)
= b˜i
(
θˆi
)
whenever t
(
θi
)
= t
(
θˆi
)
.
Proof
Let b =
(
b1 . . . , bn
)
be an equilibrium in the scoring auction. For each supplier i and each
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pseudo-type ti ∈ T consider the mixed bid ri (ti) mapping ti into a distribution over vectors
of scores. The support of ri
(
ti
)
consists of the different scored bids generated by bi for all
the types yielding pseudo-type ti, that is, the support set is
{
bi
(
θi
) | θi ∈ Θti}. Furthermore,
each scored bid in the support of ri
(
ti
)
is played with the relative frequency with which it is
played by all the types in Θti . Now, we can construct a new equilibrium where each supplier
i has the same bidding strategy for all types yielding the same pseudo-type by assigning to
all θi ∈ Θti the same mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
. That is, for all θi ∈ Θ we define b˜i (θi) = ri (t (θi)).
That b˜ =
(
b˜1, . . . , b˜n
)
is indeed an equilibrium can be seen as follows.
First, note that by construction the distribution of bids coming from each supplier i
remains unchanged when he switches from bi to b˜i. Second, consider supplier i’s expected
utility. Since b is an equilibrium we have by definition (see (12)) for all θi ∈ Θ that
bi
(
θi
) ∈ argmax
si
E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
t
(
θi
)− yi (si, b−i (θ−i))] .
Since supplier i’s private information enters his expected utility only via his pseudo-type, he
is indifferent about the bids adapted by all the types yielding the same pseudo-type. That is,
the bid bi
(
θi
)
is also a best reply for all other θˆi ∈ Θt(θi). Hence, every bid in the support
of b˜i
(
θi
)
is a best reply for all θˆi ∈ Θt(θi). It follows that b˜i is a best response for supplier
i against b−i. Since, as mentioned before, the distribution of bids coming from the other
suppliers is not changing when switching from b−i to b˜−i, b˜i is also a best response against
b˜−i. So, b˜ is an equilibrium. Furthermore, b and b˜ are outcome equivalent as both equilibria
induce the same distribution over scored bids and therefore also the same distribution over
outcomes.
2
Above we have seen that the suppliers are indifferent between an equilibrium b and its
outcome equivalent mixed counterpart b˜ constructed as in the proof of Lemma 2 since their
expected utilities are the same in both. The buyer is also indifferent between these two
equilibria. However, this cannot as easily be observed as in the suppliers’ case, and we have
to make use of the following lemma in order to show it. (Asker and Cantillon (2007) illustrate
this difficulty for a special case of our model where only one item is to be allocated among
the suppliers.)
The next result considers the equilibrium b˜ constructed for Lemma 2 above where all
types yielding the same pseudo-type ti have the same mixed bid ri(ti). We show that for
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every supplier i, ri(.) is not mixing over pure bids which induce different expected allocations
for i, except possibly on a set of measure zero.
Lemma 3 Consider the equilibrium b˜ constructed in Lemma 2 where every type yielding
pseudo-type ti has the same mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
. For every supplier i, the set of pseudo-types
ti ∈ T for which there exist elements si, sˆi in the support of ri (ti) such that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))] 6= E−i [x˜i (sˆi, b˜−i (θ−i))]
has Lebesgue measure zero. 10
Proof
Suppose that b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
is an equilibrium in the scoring auction and that b˜ =
(
b˜1, . . . , b˜n
)
is the mixed strategy equilibrium constructed as described in the proof of Lemma 2. Remem-
ber that in b˜ all of supplier i’s types yielding the same pseudo-type ti have the same mixed
bid ri(ti). Take some supplier i and some pseudo-type ti ∈ T . Each scored bid si in the
support of ri
(
ti
)
yields an expected allocation vector E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))] ∈ [0, 1]2a . The
first element of this expected allocation vector, consisting of i’s expected probability to win
item set 1, is denoted by E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
. Let si and si denote the elements in the
support of ri
(
ti
)
for which
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
≤ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
and
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
for all si in the support of ri
(
ti
)
. Thus, considering all the elements in the support of ri
(
ti
)
,
si is yielding the lowest expected probability for supplier i to win item set 1, whereas si is
yielding the highest expected winning probability.11 Let ti∗ ∈ T be a pseudo-type that differs
from ti only in its first element, that is ti∗1 6= ti1 but ti∗h = tih ∀h ∈ {2, . . . , d}. In the same
way as above we define si∗ and si∗.
10E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
is the expected allocation vector for supplier i if he makes a scored bid si and
the other suppliers bid according to b˜−i. Given that b˜−i is a profile of mixed bidding strategies, note that in
this case E−i[.] denotes the expectation taken over all type profiles θ−i as well as the corresponding mixed
strategies b˜−i
(
θ−i
)
.
11If ri
(
ti
)
is not mixing then by construction si = si and consequently E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
=
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
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From b˜ being an equilibrium and every element in the support of ri
(
ti
)
being a best
response against b˜−i for all types θi ∈ Θti (see also explanation in the proof of Lemma 2) it
follows that
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti − yi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i)) ti − yi (si∗, b˜−i (θ−i))] (13)
and
E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i)) ti∗ − yi (si∗, b˜−i (θ−i))]
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti∗ − yi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
. (14)
Adding (13) and (14) yields
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
ti + E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))] ti∗
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))] ti + E−i [xi (si, b˜−i (θ−i))] ti∗.
By rearranging the terms in the above inequality we get(
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]− E−i [xi (si∗, b˜−i (θ−i))]) (ti − ti∗) ≥ 0.
Since only ti∗1 6= ti1, whereas all the other elements of the two pseudo-types are the same, this
inequality becomes(
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
− E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))]
1
) (
ti1 − ti∗1
) ≥ 0.
Thus, E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
is monotonically increasing in ti1. This implies that
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
is Riemann integrable (see for example Khuri (2003), Theorem 6.3.2)
and hence continuous a.e. (see for example Wrede and Spiegel (2002), p.91). By performing
the same steps as above for si and si∗ we find that also E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
is continuous
a.e..
Similar to the above, from b˜ being an equilibrium and every element in the support of
ri
(
ti
)
being a best response against b˜−i for all types θi ∈ Θti it also follows that
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti − yi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i)) ti − yi (si∗, b˜−i (θ−i))] (15)
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and
E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i)) ti∗ − yi (si∗, b˜−i (θ−i))]
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti∗ − yi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
. (16)
Performing the same steps as above, (15) and (16) imply that(
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
− E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))]
1
) (
ti1 − ti∗1
) ≥ 0.
Thus, if ti1 > t
i∗1 then
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))]
1
.
Since E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
is continuous a.e. we have that
E−i
[
xi
(
si∗, b˜
−i (θ−i))]
1
→ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
a.e.
as ti∗1 → ti1. It follows that
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
a.e.
Since by definition of si and si
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
≥ E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
this implies that
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
= E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
1
a.e.
By repeating the procedure described above for the remaining d−1 elements of the pseudo-
type we find that almost everywhere it holds, that for all scored bids si, sˆi in the support of
ri
(
ti
)
E−i
[
xi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
xi
(
sˆi, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
That is, the set of pseudo-types ti for which there exist elements si, sˆi in the support of ri
(
ti
)
such that E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))] 6= E−i [x˜i (sˆi, b˜−i (θ−i))] has Lebesgue measure zero.
2
Before we have already seen that, because their expected utilities are same in both, the
suppliers are indifferent between an equilibrium b and its outcome equivalent counterpart b˜,
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constructed as in the proof of Lemma 2. Using the above Lemma 3 we can now claim the
same for the buyer. The details of the proof are stated in the appendix.
Remember that the support of the mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
, used in the construction of supplier
i’s new equilibrium strategy b˜i in the proof of Lemma 2, consists of the different scored bids
generated by the original equilibrium strategy bi for all the types in Θti . Suppose that for
some pseudo-type ti there exist scored bids in the support of ri
(
ti
)
which yield different
expected allocation vectors for i. Then, this means that bi employs allocation mixing (see
Definition 1 in the foregoing section) for the types in Θti . Similarly, if such scored bids do
not exist in the support of ri
(
ti
)
then bi does not employ allocation mixing for the types in
Θti . Based on this observation we find the following result:
Lemma 4 In every equilibrium b in the scoring auction, supplier i’s bidding strategy bi em-
ploys allocation mixing only for a set of types θi ∈ Θ that has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof
Suppose that b is an equilibrium in the scoring auction. Take some pseudo-type ti ∈ T
and consider the types yielding this pseudo-type. If there exist θi, θˆi ∈ Θti such that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))] 6= E−i[x˜i(bi(θˆi), b−i(θ−i))] then bi employs allocation mixing for
Θi
ti
. From Lemma 3 it follows that the set of pseudo-types for which this happens has
Lebesgue measure zero. This implies that also the corresponding set of types yielding these
pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero. (Remember from the foregoing section that one
property of the pseudo-type mapping is: If a set of pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero
then the set of types yielding this set of pseudo-types has also Lebesgue measure zero.)
2
Now, restricting our attention to the class of equilibria in the scoring auction where
suppliers employ allocation equivalent mixing only for a zero measure of types, we can state
based on Lemma 4 the following main result of this section:
Theorem 1 Suppose that the set of types for which suppliers employ allocation equivalent
mixing in their bidding strategies has Lebesgue measure zero. Then, for every equilibrium
in the scoring auction based on types there exists an equilibrium based on pseudo-types that
coincides with it a.e. (see Definition 3). Vice versa, every equilibrium in the restricted setting,
where strategies are based on pseudo-types, is also an equilibrium in the unrestricted setting.
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Proof
Trivially, all equilibria in the scoring auction where suppliers are constrained to make the
same bid for all types yielding the same pseudo-type are also equilibria in the unconstrained
scoring auction.
For the opposite direction, suppose that suppliers employ allocation equivalent mixing
in their biding strategies only for a zero measure of types and that b is an equilibrium in
the unconstrained scoring auction. Based on b we can construct an equilibrium bˆ in which
suppliers make the same bid for types yielding the same pseudo-type and which differs from
b at most on a set of measure zero. This is done as follows: For every supplier i and every
ti ∈ T pick some θ¯i ∈ Θti and set bˆi
(
θi
)
= bi
(
θ¯i
)
, ∀θi ∈ Θti . Since i’s private information
enters his expected utility only via his pseudo-type, bˆi is also best response against b−i (see
argument in the proof of Lemma 2). From Lemma 4 it follows that for every supplier i, bˆi
differs from bi only for a set of types θi ∈ Θ that has Lebesgue measure zero. Hence, bˆi is
also a best response against bˆ−i.
2
Considering the proof above, note that supplier i switching from his original, uncon-
strained scored bidding strategy bi to the constrained one, bˆi, is inconsequential to his own
expected utility because his private information enters it only via the pseudo-type (again, see
argument in the proof of Lemma 2). However, if bˆi differs from bi on a non-zero measure
of types then we cannot guarantee that for the other suppliers the strategy profile b−i (and
hence also bˆ−i) is still a best reply.12 We can ensure that bˆi differs from bi only on a zero
measure of types if bi employs allocation mixing and allocation equivalent mixing only for a
12In order to illustrate this point consider the following simple game. There are only two players and each
player has two possible actions - player 1 has action set {U,D}, and player 2’s action set is {L,R}. The
resulting utilities for both players are as follows:
L R
U 0,2 0,1
D 0,0 0,1
Notice that, no matter what player 2 does, player 1’s utility is always 0. One can easily see that for example
player 1 playing U with probability 1
3
and D with probability 2
3
and player 2 playing R is an equilibrium. If
player 1 switches to playing U with probability 1, this is inconsequential to his own expected utility. However,
player 2 could now increase his expected utility by switching from playing R to playing L.
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zero measure of types. With respect to allocation mixing we can verify this analytically (see
Lemma 4). However, for allocation equivalent mixing we cannot do this and have to exclude
it by assumption.
Thus, if allocation equivalent mixing is essentially absent, we can confine ourselves for the
analysis of the set of possible equilibria in the scoring auction to a restricted setting where
suppliers bid only based on their pseudo-types. Note that the expected utilities of the buyer
and the suppliers are the same in a type-based equilibrium and in the corresponding pseudo-
type based equilibrium that coincides with it almost everywhere (constructed as above in the
proof of Theorem 1).
Concerning the link between Theorem 1 and the main result of Asker and Cantillon (2007,
Theorem 1) with regard to the sufficiency of pseudo-types for the analysis of single item scoring
auctions, we observe the following. Suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies, mapping their
possible types into vectors of scores, together with the allocation rule and the winning score
rule imply an equilibrium outcome function, mapping suppliers’ possible types into outcomes
(x(.), y(.)). From Theorem 1 it readily follows that, again if suppliers essentially do not
employ allocation equivalent mixing, for every equilibrium in the scoring auction based on
types there exists an equilibrium based on pseudo-types that induces the same equilibrium
outcome function, except possibly on a set of types with Lebesgue measure zero. This finding
is the direct combinatorial scoring auction extension of Asker and Cantillon’s (2007) main
result about the role of pseudo-types as sufficient statistics in single item scoring auctions
(their Theorem 1) which is stated in terms of equilibrium outcome functions rather than the
underlying equilibrium bidding strategies (like our Theorem 1).
4 Application
The main result of the foregoing section is the multi-item extension of Asker and Cantillon’s
(2007) result that pseudo-types are a sufficient statistic in quasi-linear single item scoring
auctions. They use their result to establish a link to the well studied standard single item IPV
(independent private values) auctions and demonstrate how knowledge about these auctions
can be used for the equilibrium analysis in single item scoring auctions. Similar to them,
we can establish a link between combinatorial scoring auctions and the regular price-only
combinatorial IPV auctions.
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Observe that for every combinatorial scoring auction described in Section 2 there exists a
related combinatorial price-only auction allocating a items to n bidders where
• the allocation rule is x,
• the payment rule is y =
(
y1, . . . , yn
)
(see (7) for definition),
• bidder i’s type is his pseudo-type and is distributed accordingly,
• bidder i’s utility function is specified according to (8), that is given a true type ti his
utility for a profile of reports s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
is
ui
(
s | ti) = x˜i(s)ti − yi(s)
(see right above (6) for the definition of x˜i).
Note that a bidding strategy in the above price-only auction is a mapping T 7→ Rd. Every
bidding strategy like that can be seen as a pseudo-type based bidding strategy Θ 7→ Rd
that specifies the same bid for all types yielding the same pseudo-type. Based on the above
observations and Theorem 1 we can state the following:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the set of types for which suppliers employ allocation equivalent
mixing in their bidding strategies has Lebesgue measure zero. Then, for every equilibrium in
the scoring auction based on types there exists an equilibrium based on pseudo-types in the
corresponding combinatorial price-only auction described above that coincides with it a.e. (see
Definition 3). Vice versa, every equilibrium in the combinatorial price-only auction, where
strategies are based on pseudo-types, is also an equilibrium in the associated scoring auction.
This result is the multi-item extension of Asker and Cantillon’s (2007) Corollary 1. It implies
that if allocation equivalent mixing is essentially absent then we can use the existing literature
on combinatorial price-only auctions to analyze the equilibria in the scoring auction. In
the following we illustrate this by constructing an efficient scoring auction based on the
probably most famous combinatorial auction, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
(Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)). However, note that the classic combinatorial
auctions literature has to offer much more than just the standard VCG auction (see Cramton,
Shoham and Steinberg (2006) for an overview). A recent stream of literature for example is
dealing with sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria, see e.g. Saks and Yu (2005)
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for dominant strategy implementation and Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007) for Bayes-Nash
implementation. Another interesting stream of literature is concerned with ways to reduce
the communication complexity and the computational complexity of the allocation algorithm
in combinatorial auctions, see e.g. Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004),
Nisan and Ronen (2000), Bartal, Gonen and Nisan (2003), Dobzinski, Nisan, Shapira (2006).
An additional example of auction literature that can be used for the equilibrium analysis of
combinatorial scoring auctions is the work of Krishna and Maenner (2001) on the bidder utility
in direct revelation mechanisms with multi-dimensional private information. Their results
imply the following extension of Asker and Cantillon’s (2007) “Expected Utility Equivalence”-
Theorem for single item scoring auctions to combinatorial scoring auctions. Note that in the
following we consider pseudo-type based equilibria where a supplier assigns the same scored
bid to all types yielding the same pseudo-type. We are going to denote a supplier’s bidding
strategy as bi
(
ti
)
, that is directly as a mapping T 7→ Rd.
Corollary 2 Consider two scoring auctions (S1, . . . , Sd, x, w) and (S′1, . . . , S′d, x
′, w′) as well
as a pair of corresponding pseudo-type based equilibria b and b′. If
1) Sj = S′j, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
2) x(b(t)) = x′(b′(t)), ∀t ∈ Tn and
3) U i
(
bi
(
ti∗
) | ti) = U ′i (b′i (ti∗) | ti) for some fixed ti∗ ∈ T , ∀i ∈ N ,
then the equilibria b and b′ of the two auctions generate the same expected utility for the buyer.
Condition 1 states that both scoring auctions employ the same scoring rules. Condition 2
asserts that both allocation rules and equilibria yield the same allocation vectors for each
possible pseudo-type realization of the suppliers. Finally, Condition 3 states that both equi-
libria generate the same expected utility for supplier i with fixed pseudo-type ti∗. In order to
see why Corollary 2 holds, it is useful to observe that the buyer’s expected utility (see also
(11)) can be rewritten as
U0(b) =
∫
t∈Tn
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(t))Eθi∈Θti
[
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− c (q∗i (θi) , θi)]] g(t)dt (17)
−
n∑
i=1
∫
ti∈T
U i
(
bi
(
ti
) | ti) gi (ti) dti,
where gi denotes supplier i’s density on T , g denotes the joint density on Tn and c
(
q∗i
(
θi
)
, θi
)
=(
c1
(
q∗i1
(
θi
)
, θi
)
, . . . , cd
(
q∗id
(
θi
)
, θi
))
. Since the optimal quality levels chosen by a supplier
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(qi∗) depend only on his type and the scoring rules, it follows from Conditions 1 and 2 that
the first part of (17) is the same for both equilibria. Given Conditions 2 and 3, Proposition
1 of Krishna and Maenner (2001) implies that U i
(
bi
(
ti
) | ti) is the same for both equilibria
and hence the second part of (17) is the same for both equilibria as well.
4.1 The VCG Scoring Auction
The VCG scoring auction is specified by the scoring rules (S∗1 , . . . , S∗d), the allocation rule x
∗
and the winning score rule w∗ which we define as follows. First of all, the scoring rules (see
(2)) reflect the buyer’s valuation, that is for all j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
S∗j (pj , qj) = vj (qj)− pj .
Note that in this case the jth element of a supplier’s pseudo-type is the maximum level of
welfare that this supplier can create by producing and subsequently selling the set of item j.
The welfare generated by a profile of allocation vectors χ if suppliers have the pseudo-type
profile t is
W (χ, t) =
n∑
i=1
χ˜iti,
where χ˜i denotes supplier i’s allocation vector χi without the element for the empty item set
(see also right above (6) for definition).13
Based on a reported profile of scores s the allocation rule in the VCG scoring auction
distributes items over suppliers in such a way that welfare is maximized. This yields for every
supplier one set of items j∗ (possibly the empty set) that he is contracted to deliver. So, in
his corresponding allocation vector x∗i(s) we have that x∗ij∗(s) = 1 whereas x
∗i
j (s) = 0 for all
j 6= j∗. Furthermore, x∗(s) maximizes W (., s). So, denoting the maximal level of welfare
13To see this, note that if φj(.) = vj(.) ∀j then the buyer utility in (9) reduces to
u0 (s | θ) =
n∑
i=1
yi(s).
Adding the suppliers’ utilities (given in 8) now yields
u0 (s | θ) +
n∑
i=1
ui
(
s | θi
)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i(s)t
(
θi
)
,
so welfare depends only on the suppliers’ allocation vectors and pseudo-types.
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achievable based on score profile s by Wmax(s), we have that
Wmax(s) =
n∑
i=1
x˜∗i(s)si.
The part of this generated by other suppliers than i is
W−imax(s) =
∑
h 6=i
x˜∗h(s)sh.
Similarly to the above we define Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
as the maximum level of welfare that can be
achieved by the others without supplier i being present.
The winning score rule w∗ is now defined as follows. For the item set that he is winning
(j∗), every supplier is contracted a score reflecting the marginal impact that his presence has
on the welfare generated by all the others. For all other item sets the assigned score is zero.
That is, given a report profile s,
w∗ij∗(s) = Ŵmax
(
s−i
)−W−imax(s),
whereas w∗ij (s) = 0 for all j 6= j∗. Using (7) this implies that
y∗i(s) = x∗i(s)w∗i(s)
= Ŵmax
(
s−i
)−W−imax(s).
In the VCG scoring auction described above, it is a dominant strategy for suppliers to
make a scored bid that corresponds to their pseudo-type. That is, b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
with
bi
(
θi
)
= t
(
θi
)
is a dominant strategy equilibrium in the VCG scoring auction. This result
can be obtained directly by observing that the combinatorial price-only auction that relates
to the VCG scoring auction above as described in the beginning of Section 4 is the renowned
VCG mechanism which efficiently allocates the items and charges bidder i with a payment yi
that corresponds to the impact that his presence in the auction has on the welfare generated
by the others. It is a well-known result (see for example Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)) that
in the VCG mechanism it is a dominant strategy for bidders to truthfully bid their type ti.
For completeness we state again the rationale for this result: Suppose that the other
bidders have a fixed report s−i. Then, the utility of bidder i of type ti for making a report si
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is
ui
(
s | ti) = x˜∗i(s)ti − y∗i(s)
= x˜∗i(s)ti +W−imax(s)− Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
≤ Wmax
(
ti, s−i
)− Ŵmax (s−i)
= x˜∗i
(
ti, s−i
)
ti +W−imax
(
ti, s−i
)− Ŵmax (s−i)
= x˜∗i
(
ti, s−i
)
ti − y∗i (ti, s−i)
= ui
(
ti, s−i | ti) ,
where the first and fifth equality follow from (8), the second and fourth equality follow from
the definition of y∗i and the third equality follows from the definition of x∗. Thus, truthful
reporting is indeed optimal.
However, note that the close link to the VCG mechanism does not only imply that the
VCG scoring auction shares the same merits, like for example the implementation in dominant
startegies (so a supplier does not need to know the cost functions of the other bidders in order
to play his dominant strategy). It also implies that the VCG scoring auction exhibits the same
weaknesses, like the communication and computational complexity. A detailed discussion of
the pros and cons of the VCG mechanism can be found in Ausubel and Milgrom (2006).
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6 Appendix
Let b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
be an equilibrium in the scoring auction. In Lemma 2 we have constructed
a new mixed strategy equilibrium b˜ which is outcome equivalent to b. That is, b˜ induces the
same distribution over scored bids as b and hence also the same distribution over outcomes.
As pointed out before, it can be easily observed that suppliers are indifferent between b and
b˜ as their expected utilities are the same in both. The same can be claimed for the buyer,
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however the argument is not as straightforward as in the suppliers’ case. The reason is that
for the buyer’s expected utility not only the overall distribution of outcomes is of interest, but
also the question which outcomes are associated with which type-realizations of the suppliers.
To illustrate this point we start by considering a simplified setting where we only change the
bidding strategy of one supplier.
Consider bˆ =
(
bˆ1, b2, . . . , bn
)
where bˆ1 is constructed based on b1 as described in the proof
to Lemma 2. By the logic described in this proof, bˆ is an outcome equivalent equilibrium to
b. The expected utility of the buyer (given in (11)) if suppliers bid according to b can be
decomposed into two terms. Specifically,
U0(b) =
∫
θ∈Θn
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ yi(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ∈Θn
[
n∑
i=2
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ yi(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ (18)
+
∫
θ∈Θn
[
x˜1(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))− φ (q∗1 (θ1)))+ y1(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ.
Let us consider the first term in (18). Take some i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and look at∫
θ∈Θn
[
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))+ yi(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θi∈Θi
[
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))] (
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))− φ (q∗i (θi)))] γi (θi) dθi (19)
+
∫
θ∈Θn
[
yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Since by construction the distribution of suppliers’ bids under b is the same as under bˆ, the
second term of (19) is not changing if we switch from equilibrium b to bˆ, that is14∫
θ∈Θn
[
yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Θn
[
yi(bˆ(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Similarly, since by construction bˆi = bi and the distribution of bids coming from the other
suppliers is the same under b and bˆ we find that for all θi ∈ Θ
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
bˆi
(
θi
)
, bˆ−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
14Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, yi(bˆ(.)) already incorporates the expectation over
supplier 1’s mixed strategies. The same applies to y1(bˆ(.)) later in this section.
29
Thus, the first term of (19) is also not changing if we switch from b to bˆ.15 Hence, we find
that overall the first term in (18) is not changing if we switch from b to bˆ.
Now, let us consider supplier 1 and the second term in (18). Similar to (19) we have that∫
θ∈Θn
[
x˜1(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))− φ (q∗1 (θ1)))+ y1(b(θ))] γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ1∈Θ1
[
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))] (
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))− φ (q∗1 (θ1)))] γ1 (θ1) dθ1 (20)
+
∫
θ∈Θn
[
y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Again, since by construction the distribution of suppliers’ bids under b is the same as under
bˆ, the second term of (20) is not changing if we switch from b to bˆ, that is∫
θ∈Θn
[
y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Θn
[
y1(bˆ(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Also as before, the distribution of bids coming from the other suppliers (suppliers other than
1 that is) is by construction the same under both b and bˆ. However, since bˆ1 is not necessarily
equal to b1, we cannot guarantee that for all θ1 ∈ Θ
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))]
= E−1
[
x˜1
(
bˆ1
(
θ1
)
, bˆ−1
(
θ−1
))]
.16
Nevertheless, from Lemma 3 it follows that the set of types θ1 ∈ Θ for which
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))] 6= E−1 [x˜1 (bˆ1 (θ1) , b−1 (θ−1))]
has Lebesque measure zero. Thus, we can still guarantee that the first term of (20) is not
changing if we switch from b to bˆ.
Based on the above analysis we find that
U0(b)− U0(bˆ) = 0,
that is, the expected utility for the buyer in equilibrium b is the same as in bˆ. Furthermore,
changing the bidding strategies of the other suppliers (2, . . . , n) one by one and applying the
above analysis yields that also
U0(b)− U0(b˜) = 0,
that is, the expected utility for the buyer in equilibrium b is the same as in b˜.
15Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, E−i[.] denotes the expectation taken over all type
profiles θ−i as well as the corresponding mixed strategies of supplier 1.
16Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, E−1[.] denotes the expectation taken over all type
profiles θ−1 as well as the corresponding mixed strategies of supplier 1.
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